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NOTE
THE VISUAL ARTISTS' RIGHTS ACT OF 1990:
WHY MORAL RIGHTS CANNOT BE PROTECTED
UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you have just purchased a building and you are about
to redecorate in anticipation of starting a new business. The first thing
you want to do is get rid of a huge, ugly sculpture in the lobby. Since
the sculpture is permanently attached to the walls of the lobby, removing
it will mean its destruction. Just as your workers are about to get started,
the lobby is invaded by lawyers screaming "Stop!" One of them hands
you a court order prohibiting you from damaging the sculpture.
Bewildered that a federal court would take such an interest in your
interior decorating, you ask one of the lawyers what is happening. The
lawyer explains that the sculpture is a work of "stature" and that taking
it down will damage the reputation and honor of the artist. Your first
thought is that leaving it up will damage the reputation and honor of the
artist. "But wait," you say to yourself, "can the federal government tell
me what I can do with my sculpture in my lobby?" Under the Visual
Artists' Rights Act of 1990, it can.'

1. The pertinent sections of the Visual Artists' Rights Act provide:
§ 101. Definitions
A "work of visual art" is(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, [or] in a
limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author
A work of visual art does not include(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, applied
art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical, data
base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication;
(ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, covering, or
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packaging material or container, ...
(B) any work made for hire; or
(C) any work not subject to copyright protection under this title.
§ 106A. Rights of certain authors to attribution and integrity
(a) RIGHTS OF ATTRmtrnON AND INTEGRrY.... [T]he author of a work of visual art(1) shall have the right(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art
which he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work
of visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and
(3)... shall have the right(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional
distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any
intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.
(b) SCOPE AND EXERCISE OF RIGHTS.-Only the author of a work of visual art
has the rights conferred by subsection (a) in that work, whether or not the author is the
copyright owner....
(c) EXCEPTIONS.-(1) The modification of a work of visual art which is a result
of the passage of time or the inherent nature of the materials is not a distortion, mutilation, or other modification described in subsection (a)(3)(A).
(3) The rights described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall not apply to any
reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work in, upon, or in any connection
with any item described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of the definition of "work of visual
art" in section 101.
(d) DURATION OF RIGTS.-(1) With respect to works of visual art created on or
after the effective date... of the Visual Arts Rights Act of 1990, the rights conferred by
subsection (a) shall endure for a term consisting of the life of the author.
(e) TRANSFER AND WAIVER.--(1) The rights conferred by subsection (a) may not
be transferred, but those rights may be waived if the author expressly agrees to such
waiver in a written instrument signed by the author. Such instrument shall specifically
identify the work, and uses of that work, to which the waiver applies, and the waiver
shall apply only to the work and uses so identified...
(2) Ownership of the rights conferred by subsection (a) with respect to a work of visual
art is distinct from ownership of any copy of that work, or of a copyright or any
exclusive right under a copyright in that work.
§ 113. Scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works [removal of
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The events described above are essentially what happened in Carter
v. Helmsley-Spear,2 the first case to interpret the Visual Artists' Rights
Act of 1990 ("VARA"). 3 VARA was passed as part of the federal

copyright law to protect the "moral rights" of visual artists.' Moral rights
under VARA are the "right" of attribution (the right of the author to
claim authorship of the work) and the "right" of integrity (the right of the
author to prevent any intentional alteration or destruction of the work that
might be prejudicial to the author's reputation or honor).' Under VARA,
if a piece of art has "stature" in the community, the moral rights in the
work belong to the artist even after the work has been sold.' In Carter,
the court enjoined the building owner from removing the sculpture

works of visual art from buildings]
(d)(1) In a case which(A) a work of visual art has been incorporated in or made part of a building in
such a way that removing the work from the building will cause the destruction,
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work as described in section
106A(a)(3), and
(B) the author consented to the installation of the work in the building either
before the effective date [of the Act] ... or in a written instrument [waiving his or her
rights pursuant to section 106A(e)] .... then the rights conferred by paragraphs (2) and
(3) of section 106A(a) shall not apply.
(2) If the owrier of a building wishes to remove a work of visual art which is a part of
such building and which can be removed from the building without the destruction,
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work as described in section
106A(a)(3), the author's rights under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 106A(a) shall
apply unless(A) the owner has made a diligent, good faith attempt without success to notify
the author..., or
(B) the owner did provide such notice in writing and the person so notified failed,
within 90 days after receiving such notice, either to remove the work or to pay for its
removal.
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106A, 113(d) (1994).
2. 861 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd in part,rev'd in part,vacated in part, 71 F.3d
77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996). It is not my intention to discuss Carter
directly, but I will refer to it throughout this Note to illustrate various propositions.
3. VARA potentially covers all visual art, including art that is removable. This Note focuses
on a Carter-type situation, where the art cannot be removed without its destruction, because it is in
this situation that the constitutional issues are most clear. VARA has a special section addressing
artwork in buildings but, remarkably, it does not address a situation where the art cannot be removed
without its destruction and when no waiver was signed by the artist. See 17 U.S.C. § 113(d)(1), (2).
4. Keith A. Attlesey, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: The Art of Preserving
Building Owners' Rights, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 371, 371-72 (1992).
5. Matthew A. Goodin, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: FurtherDefining the
Rights and Duties ofArtists and Real PropertyOwners, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 567, 568-69
(1992).
6. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (a)(3), (b), (e)(1).
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because under VARA, only the artist has the right to alter or destroy his
work.7
The theory of moral rights, which is much more expansive than
what is protected under VARA, is derived from French law.' Innocentsounding French legal principals, though, can be very misleading. For
instance, French law guarantees separation of church and state,9 as does
American law." In France, however, this means school children are not
allowed to wear religious symbols to public schools because to do so
would violate secularism." Also, like the United States, France prides
itself on the freedom of its press.' 2 Yet, in France, book banning is
permitted, and it is illegal to publish poll results before a presidential
election. 3 The theory of moral rights is just as misleading. Moral rights
are not related to our traditional sense of morals, and more importantly,
they are not rights in the sense that they are protected by the Constitution. This Note argues that the federal government cannot protect moral
rights. Part I demonstrates that the Constitution provides no authority for
federal protection of moral rights. This part focuses on the most likely
sources of authority: the copyright power, 4 the commerce power, 5
and the treaty power. 6 Part I shows that even if the federal government had the authority to regulate moral rights, such authority would
violate the First Amendment.' 7 Part IV discusses the danger VARA

7. Carter, 861 F. Supp. at 324, 326. A photo of the sculpture appears on page 42 of the
November 1994 American Bar Association Journal. According to the attorney for the artists, the
sculpture had been described as "Coney Island on acid." ObiterDicta-SculptureSquabble,A.B.A. J.,
Nov. 1994, at 42.
8. Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a FederalSystem of
Moral Rights Protectionfor VisualArt, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945, 948 (1990). For example, moral
rights protection under the Berne Convention, see infra part II.B., covers all literary and artistic
works, lasts as long as a copyright and does not allow the artist to waive his or her rights as does
VARA. Damich, supra, at 947; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106A (e).
9. Youssef M. Ibrahim, FranceBans Muslim Scarf In Its Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11,
1994, at 4.
10. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
11. See Ibrahim, supra note 9.
12. Douglas Lavin, ElectronicBreach of PublishingBan Sparks FrenchFuror,WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 25, 1996, at B8.
13. Id.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16. Id. art. VI, cl. 2; id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
17. The building owner in Carter argued that VARA constituted an unlawful taking in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. 861 F. Supp. at 326. Although the court rejected this argument,
it did so on weak legal grounds. The court likened VARA to historical preservation laws and relied
on Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), which upheld New York
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poses to artists. Part V recommends that art continue to be governed by
the free market instead of by government. Part VI concludes that VARA
should be repealed.

City's historic preservation law, to uphold VARA. Carter,861 F. Supp. at 327-28. This reliance is
misplaced because the statute at issue in Penn only applied to the exterior of the building. See Penn,
438 U.S. at 111-12. VARA extends government regulation to the interior of a privately owned
building. See supra note 1.
The Cartercourt found that there was no permanent physical invasion, because protection
under VARA only lasted for the life of the artist and, therefore, it was not "permanent." 861 F.
Supp. at 328. Common sense dictates that if the artist outlives the owner, there is nothing temporary
about it. More importantly, though, the court misconstrued the meaning of "temporary." "Temporary"
in takings terms is people handing out leaflets in the parking lot of a shopping center. "Permanent"
is a telephone pole being installed on a property. The telephone pole may only be there a short time,
but the space it occupies is exclusive and, therefore, permanent. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 429 (1982). The space occupied by the sculpture was exclusive and,
therefore, "permanent." See id.
The court also found that the owner was compensated by the increase in value in his
property from the sculpture. I doubt even the court believed this was true since later it went on to
say, "Indeed, it seems that the preservation of VARA-protected artwork will in certaincircumstances
make owners' properties more, rather than less" valuable, as if it was surprised by the possibility.
Carter,861 F. Supp. at 328 (emphasis added). Even if the sculpture did increase the value of the
property, the increase was not compensation to the owner because he was already entitled to it by
virtue of the fact that he purchased the sculpture.
In spite of the court's poor handling of the takings issue, the takings argument is difficult
to support. The weakness of the takings argument is that if VARA was law when the building owner
bought the sculpture, he never received the right to destroy the sculpture in the first place. This right
is, of course, a valuable property right and the court would be wrong to award it to the building
owner without compensation to the artist. United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 273, 37778 (1945). Interestingly, the takings argument was one of the main arguments at trial. See Carter,
861 F. Supp. at 326-29. On appeal, however, the Second Circuit did not address the issue at all. See
Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996).
Instead, the court overturned Carteron the grounds that the artists were employees, not independent
contractors and, therefore, were not entitled to VARA protection. Id. at 87.
If I were to suggest a takings argument, though, I would suggest this theory: The sculpture
is personal property, as opposed to the owner's real property which was the subject of the takings
argument. Property is a bundle of rights including the right to dispose of the property. General
Motors, 323 U.S. at 377-78. When the owner decided to get rid of the sculpture, the only right that
had any value to him was the right to dispose of it. The right to dispose of it though was reserved
in the artist. Therefore, in terms of ownership, the only right in the work of any value belonged to
the artist. For all practical purposes, the sculpture belonged to the artist since the building owner's
interest had no value. To say the building owner "owned" the sculpture would be a fiction. Because
the court ordered the sculpture to remain, a permanent physical invasion had occurred. Without
compensation, such an invasion is an unlawful taking. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441. It makes no
difference that the sculpture belonged to the artist rather than the government. See id. at 440.
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I.

No FEDERAL PROTECTION OF MORAL RIGHTS UNDER THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

A. Limits on Federal Power
The powers not delegatedto the UnitedStates by the Constitution,
norprohibitedby it18to the States, are reservedto the States respectively, or to the people.
VARA is unconstitutional because there is no source of power in the
Constitution for federal regulation of moral rights. The federal government is a government of limited powers. 9 In determining whether the
Constitution provides authority for a certain law, the fundamental
question is not what power the federal government should have, but what
power the federal government does have.2 ° It is a basic truth, reflected
in the Tenth Amendment, that if a law is enacted by the federal
government without constitutional authority, the law is invalid." "The
actual scope of the Federal Government's authority... has changed over
the years, . . . but the constitutional structure underlying and limiting that
authority has not."' Simply put, no matter how much the people may
want a law, Congress may simply not exercise a power it does not
have.2 3
The importance of keeping the powers of the federal government
"few and defined"24 cannot be understated. "In the tension between
federal and state power lies the promise of liberty."25 Concentrating
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
19. Gregory v. Ashcrof 501 U.S. 452, 457-58 (1991) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 45
(James Madison)). The full quote is worth reading:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government arefew and
defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite ...The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.
Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
20. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 157 (1992) (citing United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 63 (1936)).
21. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) ("It is a proposition too
plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it .... "); see also
New York, 505 U.S. 144, 157.
22. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 159.
23. Id.
24. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
25. Id. at 459.
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power in the federal government "as an expedient solution to the crisis
of the day" relieves this tension and threatens liberty.26 Limiting
government power is the surest way to prevent federal power from being
abused. Detailed regulations defining government authority are no
substitute.
B.

The Copyright Power

The Congress shall have the power... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securingfor limited imes to Authors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
and Inventors
27
Discoveries.
The regulation of moral rights is the regulation of rights in physical
property and, as such, it is outside the scope of the federal government's
authority under the copyright power. VARA was incorporated into the
Copyright law,28 because moral rights have been viewed as a type of
copyright protection. For instance, moral rights protection is embodied
in the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Property ("Berne Convention") which is a treaty for the international
protection of copyrights. 29 Among other provisions, the Berne Convention provides that signatories provide moral rights protection that lasts as
long as copyright protection.3 ° Although VARA was not passed
pursuant to the Berne Convention,"1 Congress shared the belief that
moral rights protection is a type of copyright protection. Rep. Edward
Markey, sponsor of the original VARA bill and supporter of the final
bill, illustrated this belief when he lamented that "[t]here is an unfortunate problem, however, in that too often a work is treated simply as a
physical piece of property, rather than as an intellectual work ....
However, a work of art is a piece of physical property, not a piece
of intellectual property. "The author of a painting, when it is finished,
before publication, owns a material piece ofpersonalproperty,consisting
of the canvas and the paint upon it.""3 The right to alter or destroy a

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 187.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S.C. § 106A (1994).
Damieh, supra note 8, at 945-46.
Id. at 947.
See infra part II.D.
136 CoNG. REC. H3111, 3115 (daily ed. June 5, 1990).
Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Price, 170 F.2d 715, 718 (5th Cir. 1948) (emphasis added).
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piece of property is a long recognized property right.3 4 VARA, which
regulates the alteration and destruction of a piece of art, therefore
regulates property rights, not copyrights.
VARA itself reflects this distinction. Ownership of rights conferred

by VARA is "distinct from ownership of any copy of that work, or of a
copyright or any exclusive right under a copyright in that work."35 In
fact, VARA,
although part of the copyright law, does not apply to
36
copies.
The copyright power does not give the federal government the
power to regulate property rights. The property right and the incorporeal
right of copyright are "in their nature essentially and inherently
distinct."37 A property right is a right to possess, use, and dispose of a
physical thing.38 A copyright is a right to engage in or authorize certain
activities; 39 it does not extend to the physical manifestation40 of the
thing copyrighted. 4' The power to regulate the transfer of personal
property is reserved to the states.42 Thus, the copyright power does not
grant Congress authority to regulate moral rights.

34. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (holding that
property "denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the
right to possess, use and dispose of it") (emphasis added). This is precisely the right the building
owner in Carterwas trying to exercise. See supra part I.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2); see also 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) ("Only the author of a work of
visual art has the rights conferred by [VARA] in that work, whether or not the author is the
copyright owner.") (emphasis added).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3) (moral rights granted in 106A do not apply to any "reproduction,
depiction, portrayal, or other use of a work in, upon, or in any connection" with a work of visual

art).
37. Local Trademarks, Inc., 170 F.2d at 718 (citations omitted).
38. See General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 378.
39. United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1982).
40. The physical manifestation of the thing copyrighted is personal property. Local
Trademarks, Inc., 170 F.2d at 718.
41. Smith, 686 F.2d at 239-40. The distinction between the copyright and the physical
manifestation of the copyright is reflected in the copyright law:
Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct
from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied. Transfer of
ownership of any material object,... in which the work is first fixed, does not of itself
convey any rights in the copyrighted work embodied in the object ....
17 U.S.C. § 202 (1994).
42. Campbell v. Bagley, 276 F.2d 28, 32 (5th Cir. 1960); see also supra part II.A.
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C.

The Commerce Clause

The Congress shall have the Power... To regulate Commerce
Nations, and among the severalStates, and with the Indian
with foreign
43
Tribes.
That the copyright power does not extend to the regulation of moral
rights does not, in itself, mean the federal government does not have the

power to protect moral rights. VARA would still be valid if authority for
moral rights regulation could be found elsewhere in the Constitution. The
Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the authority to regulate
interstate commerce, 44 is a potential source of authority because moral
rights regulation requires the regulation of the sale of artwork. Therefore,
the Commerce Clause must be addressed before concluding that the
federal government does not have the power to protect moral rights.
The short answer to the Commerce Clause question is that VARA
regulates property rights, 4 property rights are governed by state law,46
and therefore, the Commerce Clause does not provide authority for
VARA. a7 Of course, Supreme Court jurisprudence makes short answers
to Commerce Clause questions difficult-a closer look at the question is
necessary.
Under Supreme Court cases decided since the New Deal, Congress
can reach intrastate trade where necessary to make the regulation of
49 for instance, Coninterstate trade effective. 48 In Wickard v. Filburn
gress, in an attempt to control the volume of wheat moving in interstate

43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
44. Id.
45. See supra part II.B.
46. Campbell, 276 F.2d at 32.
47. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1642 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring).
48. Another way to look at it is this: Congress can reach intrastate trade where the intrastate
trade has a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119-20
(1941). Where intrastate trade has only a trivial effect on interstate commerce Congress can reach

it if the cumulative effect of all similar acts on interstate trade would be substantial. Wickard v.
Filbum, 317 U.S. I 11, 127-28 (1942). Congress can even reach intrastate activity that has no effect
on interstate trade where the intrastate activity is part of a class of activities that has an effect on
interstate commerce. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). Also, Congress can reach
intrastate trade where the intrastate trade is so co-mingled with interstate trade that regulating the
interstate trade would be impossible without also being able to regulate the intrastate trade. Darby,
312 U.S. at 120 (citing Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States (Shreveport Case), 234 U.S.
342 (1914)).
49. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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trade, was able to reach the consumption of home grown wheat, because
home grown wheat was the most variable factor in interstate wheat commerce. ° In United States v. Darby,51 Congress could reach the wages
of employees involved in the manufacture of goods intended for
interstate commerce, because the use of substandard working conditions
in one state would promote the use of substandard working conditions in
other states through competition in interstate commerce. 2 In Perez v.
United States,53 Congress could reach local loan sharking, because it
was a major source of funds for organized crime which operated
interstate. 4 In each of these cases, the regulation of interstate trade
would have been ineffective had Congress not been able to reach
intrastate trade.
Although some may argue that VARA's purpose is to effectuate the
regulation of interstate commerce by protecting works of art, that
argument is simply wrong. VARA's purpose is not to protect works of
art, it is merely to protect the reputations of individual artists. It is true
that the stated goals of VARA include both (i) protecting the honor and
reputation of visual artists and (ii) protecting the works of art, as well as
(iii) providing for nationwide standards for (i) and (ii)." It is also true
that Rep. Markey supported VARA with a story he heard about two
entrepreneurs who bought a Picasso print and cut it into 500 one-inch
pieces to be sold for $135 each, thus implying that VARA's purpose was
to protect such works. 6 However, the work spoken of by Rep. Markey
would not have been protected by VARA-VARA's protections last only
as long as the life of the artist.57 Because Picasso is dead, none of his
works can qualify for VARA's protections. In contrast, any kindergarten
fingerpainting could, in theory, someday be protected by VARA as long
as its creator is still alive. Thus, while VARA offers no protection to
Picassos, it offers potential protection to fingerpaintings. To believe that
VARA's purpose is to protect works of art, therefore, one would have to
come to the absurd conclusion that, in an effort to protect works of art,
Congress decided to offer more protection to fingerpaintings than to

50. 317 U.S. at 127.
51. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
52. 312 U.S. at 109-10.
53. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
54. 402 U.S. at 157.
55. 136 CONG. REc. H3111, H3113 (daily ed. June 5, 1990) (statement of Rep. Kastemser).
56. 136 CoNG. REc. H31 11, H3115. The idea was that each buyer would be able to purchase
a Picasso piece of his or her very own. Id.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1).
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Picassos. Clearly, the more logical conclusion is that VARA's only real
purpose is to protect the reputations of individual living artists. Thus,
VARA does not address an interstate commerce interest.
Without some interstate commerce interest, VARA does not provide
the federal government with grounds to reach beyond interstate
commerce into intrastate commerce as did the statutes in Darby,
Wickard, and Perez. To allow Congress to regulate mere intrastate
commerce without addressing an interstate commerce interest would be
to give Congress unlimited power over all commerce, which is an
impossibility under the Constitution.5 8 The regulation of moral rights is,
therefore, beyond the powers granted to Congress under the Commerce
Clause.
D. The Treaty Power
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the UnitedStates, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land .... 5'
The Congress shall have Power... To make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States .. . ."
The concept of moral rights is embodied in the Berne Convention
treaty.6 This treaty provides for the international protection of copyrights and was signed by the United States in 1989.62 The United States
declared that adequate protection of moral rights already existed when it
signed the agreement and, therefore, special moral rights protection was
not included in the 1988 Berne Implementation Act.63 VARA was
58. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1632-34 (1995); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 194-95 (1824) ("ITihe enumeration of the particular classes of commerce to which the
power was to be extended, would not have been made, had the intention been to extend the power
to every description.... The completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be considered as
reserved for the State itself."); supra part II.A.
59. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
60. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
61. Damich, supra note 8, at 946.
62. Id.
63. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists
Rights Act and the Architectural Workr Copyright ProtectionAct of 1990, 14 COLuM.-VLA J.L. &
ARTS 477, 477-78 (1990). Some form of moral rights legislation had been regularly introduced in
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actually modeled after the California Arts Preservation Act.64 Because
VARA was not passed pursuant to a treaty, the treaty power does not

provide authority for the regulation of moral rights.
Even if VARA was passed pursuant to the Berne Convention, the
treaty power would still not provide a source of federal power, because
65
a treaty may not contravene the prohibitory words of the Constitution.
66
As will be discussed below, VARA violates the First Amendment.
IL.

VARA VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT

Congress shall make no law.

..

abridging the freedom of

speech ....
67
A. Art Is Speech
Even if there was authority in the Constitution for the federal
government to regulate moral rights, VARA would still be unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment. Art is a type of speech
protected by the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. 6' This
protection has become more important in recent years as
"[p]aintings ...become more explicitly political [and] other aspects of
the artistic enterprise are devalued., 69 By regulating the display of art,
VARA is regulating speech and, therefore, the constitutionality of VARA
must be evaluated under First Amendment standards.70 VARA violates
the First Amendment in several ways.

Congress for nine years preceding the Berne Convention. Id. at 978 n.10.
64. Attlesey, supra note 4, at 371.
65. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 419 (1920).
66. See infra part III.
67. U.S. CONST. amend I.
68. Piarowski v. Illinois Community College, 759 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir.) (citing Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 34-35 (1973)), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1007 (1985).
69. Edward Rothstein, The Tribulationsof the Not-So-Living Arts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1996,
§ 4, at 1.
70. Congressional enactments are presumed constitutional, but this presumption has less force
when the legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution. United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). When a law infringes on rights
protected by the Bill of Rights, the government has the burden of establishing its constitutionality.
Association of Community Org. v. Municipality of Golden, Colo., 744 F.2d 739, 746 (10th Cir.
1984).
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B.

Violations of the FirstAmendment

1. Restricting the Art Owner's Ability to Destroy a Piece of Art
He or She Owns71
The Supreme Court has clearly stated that the government may not
regulate conduct because of the communicative element in the conduct, 72 yet, this is precisely what VARA does. VARA purports to
protect the reputation of the artist by restricting the owner's ability to
destroy a piece of art. 3 A person's reputation, though, is nothing more
than the opinions people hold about that person.74 The concern addressed by VARA is that destroying a piece of art conveys the owner's
negative opinion of the artist.7" VARA protects the reputation of the
artist by preventing the owner from conveying a negative opinion of the
artist through the act of destroying the art.
It is true that "[a] law directed at the communicative nature of
conduct .... like a law directed at speech itself, [can] be justified by the
substantial showing of need . . 76 However, neither the protection of
an individual's reputation nor any other showing of need can justify the
regulation of conduct directed at an opinion communicated by conduct.
Opinions, which cannot be false,77 have absolute First Amendment
protection." This absolute protection applies no matter how unreasonable

71. Before you yell "Philistine," keep in mind that I am not encouraging owners to destroy art;
I am merely pointing out that they have a right to do so if they choose.
72. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1989).
73. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3); H.RL REP. No. 101-514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1990),
reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6803, 6926 ('[D]estruction of works of art has a detrimental effect
on the artist's reputation.").
74. See generally Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1007-08 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring).
75. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995) ("destruction of a work
shows the utmost contempt for the artist's honor or reputation," (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 1824 (1996).
76. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406 (citations omitted).
77. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 976.
78. Id. at 975 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)). It is true the Supreme
Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. stated, "We are not persuaded that, in addition to these
protections, an additional separate constitutional privilege for 'opinion' is required to ensure the
freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment." 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990). However, this
does not contradict the holding of Oilman. The Supreme Court in Milkovich affirmed absolute
constitutional protection for statements that could not "reasonably be interpreted as stating actual
facts." Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20 (citations omitted). The Court was concerned about statements of
fact being couched in terms of opinion. For example, the statement "In my opinion Mayor Jones is
a liar," would not be protected by the First Amendment because it is really asserting a fact-that the
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the opinion of the art may be.79 The government simply may not
regulate opinions to prevent them from being unfair.80 Because VARA's
regulation is directed at opinion, it cannot be justified by any showing of
need. VARA's regulation of moral rights, therefore, is an absolute
violation of the First Amendment.
2. VARA Mandates the Art Owner's Speech by Forcing the
Owner to Display a Piece of Art
By forcing an owner to display a piece of art to protect the artist's
reputation,"1 VARA is forcing the owner to express a particular opinion
about the artist. Such an act, because it has a communicative element, is
protected by the First Amendment. 2 Freedom of speech under the First
Amendment includes the freedom not to speak, 3 and thus, the freedom
not to express an opinion.' Because an owner has a First Amendment
right not to express an opinion, he or she has a First Amendment right
not to display a work for the purpose of protecting the artist's reputation.8 ' Therefore, by forcing the art owner to protect the reputation of
the artist, the regulation of moral rights violates the First Amendment.
The art owner also has a First Amendment right not to convey
whatever message may be contained in the art itself. The government
may not "require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an
ideological message by displaying it on his property in a manner and for
the express purpose that it be observed ... by the public. 8 6 It is true

mayor is a liar. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20. Conversely, the statement "In my opinion Mayor Jones
shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and Lenin," would be
constitutionally protected because it contains no assertion of fact. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20.

79. Olman,750 F.2d at 1022 (Robinson, J., concurring); see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 51, 55, 57 (1988).
80. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 803 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
81. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 326 ($.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'd in part,rev'd
in part, vacated in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1824 (1996); see supra
note 2.
82. See supra part III.B.I.
83. Riley, 487 U.S. at 796-97 (1988). "Mandating speech that a speaker would not otherwise
make necessarily alters the content of the speech... [and is therefore] ... content-based regulation
of speech." Id. at 795.

84. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 976 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also supra part III.1.
85. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (nolding that

"no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein") (emphasis
added).

86. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
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that the purpose of VARA is to protect the reputation of the artist, 87 not
to disseminate the message contained in a particular piece of art.
However, by forcing the owner to display the work to protect an artist's
reputation, the government, as a result, is also forcing the owner to
communicate the message contained in the art. The goal of protecting an
88
individual's reputation is not a compelling government interest.
"[S]uch interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right
to avoid becoming [a] courier for such a message."8 9 The regulation of
moral rights, therefore, violates the First Amendment by requiring the
owner to communicate an ideological message.
3. VARA Treats Artists' Speech Unequally
"[L]t is a central tenant of the First Amendment that the government
must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas."90 All ideas must be
considered of equal value under the law and be given an equal opportunity to be heard.91 In the area of non-commercial speech, the government
may not "evaluate the strength of, or distinguish between various
communicative interests."92 Yet, when courts are asked to determine the
"stature" of a piece of art under VARA,93 they are being asked to
determine if the artist's speech is worthy of government protection. As
a result, some speech will receive government protection while other
speech will not. Artists have a First Amendment right to have their
speech offered the same protection by the government.94 Regulation of
moral rights, therefore, violates the First Amendment by subjecting
artists' speech to unequal treatment.
Unequal treatment could be permissible if there is an "appropriate
95
governmental interest suitably furthered by the differential treatment.
However, VARA's purpose is to protect a living artist's reputation 96

87. See supra part II.B.
88. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988).
89. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
90. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. at 56 (citations omitted).

91. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
92. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514 (1981).

93. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
94. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96-98; Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 514. In this context, it is
interesting to note the title of 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the main section of VARA: "Rights of certain
authors to attribution and integrity." (emphasis added). VARA's legislative history is also
enlightening: "This legislation covers only a very select group of artists." H.R. REP. No. 10 1-514,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6803, 6921 (emphasis added).
95. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95.
96. See supra part II.C.
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which is not a compelling government interest.9 7 Therefore, VARA
cannot be justified on compelling interest grounds.
4. VARA Subjects Both the Artist's and the Art Owner's
Speech to Vague Regulatory Standards
For a piece of art to be protected under VARA, it must be a work
of "stature." 98 However, VARA does not define "stature."99 "It is a
basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if
its prohibitions are not clearly defined."'1'0 Using stature as a standard,
without more, is particularly troublesome in this respect, because it "is
inherently incapable of being adjudicated with any expectation of
accuracy.... Asking a finder of fact to determine stature calls on the
finder of fact to speculate and "render a decision based upon the
approval or disapproval of the contents of the statement, its author, or its
subject," which is not permissible under our system."0 Ultimately, the
vagueness of the term "stature" leaves what is basically a policy decision
to the trier of fact to determine on a subjective basis. 3 This is clearly
demonstrated in Carter where the judge, although finding the expert
witnesses for both sides to be well qualified, ruled in favor of the artist,
because the expert for the building owner had a "disdain for contemporary art."0' By discrediting the expert's testimony because the expert
did not like modem art, the judge was merely replacing the expert's
opinion with his own.'
The danger of subjectivity inherent in determining "stature" is
especially strong under VARA, because it calls on the trier of fact to
make aesthetic judgments."° As Justice Holmes once wrote, it is "a

97. See Hustler Magazine, Inc., 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988).

98. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
99. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 303, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd inpart, rev'd
in part, vacated in part, 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824 (1996); see supra
note 2.
100. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
101. Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
102. Olman, 750 F.2d at 981.
103. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 (1972) ("A vague law impermissibly delegates basic
policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with
the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.").
104. 861 F. Supp. at 326.
105. The judge was not failing to follow the law by doing this---he was doing exactly what
VARA unfortunately invites him to do.
106. See Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 824 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981).
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dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside the
narrowest and most obvious limits."'0 7 To allow the First Amendment
rights of the artist and owner to be subordinated to the subjective,
untrained tastes of the judge or jury, would clearly operate "to inhibit the
exercise" of free speech and therefore is unconstitutional.'0
Calling witnesses to testify about a work's stature will not provide
the court with constitutionally adequate grounds on which to base its
decision. Testimony about a work's stature would provide the court with
nothing more than "contradictory opinions about opinions."'" For
instance, in Serra v. United States General Services Administration
(decided before VARA, but struggled with the same questions), both
sides called witnesses to testify about the famous "Tilted Arc" sculpture
in the Federal Plaza in New York."' The artists called the oxidation of
the steel "a golden amber patina," while the area residents and workers
called it "rust.' Judicially determining whether oxidation is a "golden
amber patina" or "rust" is the equivalent of judicially determining
whether a glass of water is half full or half empty.
To suggest that using art "critics" as expert witnesses can bring
some clarity and objectivity to a VARA proceeding is wishful thinking.
In the Fall of 1994, the New York Times--hardly known for being
unsympathetic to the arts"--published an article which suggested that
art criticism has sunk into "paralysis" as a result of "contemporary art's
obsession with itself.""' 3 According to the article, "[a]s art has increasingly become the product of an ongoing exchange about itself,... [art
critics] have developed their own abstracted vocabulary and obscure
frames of reference ....The insular nature of the conversation can leave
casual readers clueless, and serious readers uncertain."'" 4 To illustrate
the "trend toward obfuscation,""' 5 the article reprinted some recent
quotes of published art critics. For instance, one critic made this

107. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
108. Grayned,408 U.S. at 109 (citations omitted).
109. Olman, 750 F.2d at 1006.
110. 847 F.2d 1045 (2d Cir. 1988). The "Tilted Are" was a steel wall that cut across the plaza.
Id. at 1047.
111. Id. at 1047.
112. See, e.g., Art and Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1995, at 12 (expressing concern about the
current state of arts funding).
113. Diana . Schemo, The Jabberwocky of Art Criticism,N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1994, § 4, at 1.
114. Id. at 16.

115. Id. at 1.
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evaluation: "[IHelmut] Federle's grouping of works also suggests a kind
of epigenesis of abstraction: each stage offers a greater, more exacting
epiphany of the idea of abstraction as such and the essential consciousness-a consciousness that can recognize and deal with essences (in a
Husserlian sense)-than the preceding one."11 6 Another critic wrote,
"[p]erhaps we've seen too many sculptures dealing with the human body
in the last few years, or perhaps the impressive artisanry (by expert
tailors) overwhelmed the metaphoric possibilities of the work, or perhaps
the metaphor itself (weight as content) was simply too obvious."". 7
Could you imagine listening to these statements as a judge? Such
testimony would do little to aid the court in its decision.
Of course, it is possible that the nature and quality of art criticism
will develop to a point where it can provide some genuine guidance, but
not in the context of VARA. The New York Times article suggests that
art criticism is obfuscated to hide a "dirty secret whispered by experts
who do not want to be named: that much of the art that critics write
about is simply not very interesting." ' Given such an ulterior motive
for the criticism, it is not surprising that art criticism lacks clarity and
decisiveness. However, VARA replaces that ulterior motive with yet
another-expert witness fees. Given an art critic's incentive to support
the conclusion of the side that hires him, and the subjective nature of art
itself, it is folly to believe that expert testimony by art critics in VARA
proceedings will ever develop to a point where it can provide useful,
constitutionally sufficient criteria on which the court could base a
decision.
The aggregate of opinions cannot produce a fact." 9 Without clear
standards or an objective method to determine which art has "stature,"
VARA will ultimately subordinate First Amendment rights to the
subjective views of a judge or jury. The regulation of moral rights
violates the First Amendment by subjecting speech to such standards.
IV. VARA Is BAD PUBLIC POLICY
VARA is likely to hurt, rather than help artists as a group. The
attorney for the artists in Carter said, in reference to the decision, "I

116.

Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 16.
119. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1006 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (MacKinnon, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
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think it says that art is important and deserves protection."' 2 ° This is
a common misconception-laws that offer special protections for certain
groups of people do not imply that they deserve protection, but rather,
that they need protection.' Although such laws are sometimes appropriate, it is doubtful they do much to enhance the reputation of a
profession. Laws like VARA, which restrict a person's ability to transfer
property,'2 restrict a person's ability to manage his or her own affairs. 123 Such laws are generally associated with children, not adults.
The problem for artists is VARA's implication that artists need this
special protection by the government to help them maintain their
reputations. It implies that their work is not of sufficient quality to
sustain their reputations without federal assistance. 124 VARA's special
protections for artists will, therefore, hurt rather than help, the reputation
of artists as a group.
This is not to say that artists are not having trouble these days--they
are. According to a recent New York imes article, arts that depend on
new works (i.e., concert halls, theaters) are having trouble, while
museums, which "thrive on collections of masterpieces and [do] not
depend on new acquisitions," are doing very well."z The obvious
implication is that there is not as much demand for the work of new
artists. The Times suggests that one reason for this "crisis" is "the
uncertainty in artistic achievement."' 26 It even goes on to suggest that,
these days, "the very notion of high artistic achievement is often regarded
as chimera."' 27
It must be tempting to try and counteract this uncertainty by looking
to the federal government for endorsement, but the uncertainty regarding
artists' achievement can only be increased by VARA. When a product

120. Obiter Dicta-SculptureSquabble, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 42 (emphasis added).
121. See Regents of Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Although in a different
context, the Supreme Court in Bakke recognized that "preferential programs may only reinforce
common stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special
proteetion." Id. at 298 (emphasis added).

122. 17 U.S.C. § 106A provides that the artist may not transfer his moral rights in the artwork.
Moral rights are property rights. See supra part II.B.

123. The Berne Convention literally prohibits the artist from waiving his moral rights out of
"concern about protecting the artist 'even against himself."' Damich, supra note 8, at 947 (citation
omitted) (emphasis added).
124. For this reason, VARA should prove to be much more popular among untalented artists
than talented ones.

125. Rothstein, supra note 69, at 14.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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succeeds in a free market, where no single person has control, there is a
presumption that the product succeeded on its merits. 28 However,
when a product succeeds as a result of decisions made by an identifiable
person, there is always a suspicion that the decision was made based on
1 29
the preference of that person rather than on the merits of the product.
This suspicion can lead to uncertainty about the product's quality. 30
Under VARA, the success of a piece of art will be determined by
a judge rather than the market. As a result, there will naturally be doubts
about the merits of the piece. As more cases are pursued under VARA,
more works of art will be displayed under court order and there will be
more works subject to the same doubt. This can only increase the
uncertainty regarding the achievement of current artists.
The irony is that VARA does not give artists anything that they did
not have already. Courts already protect artists' rights under various legal
theories including copyright, unfair competition, invasion of privacy,
defamation, and breach of contract. 3 ' Furthermore, an artist has always
been free to reserve rights in32 his or her work, including moral rights,
through the contract of sale.
It may be true that an artist will have to sell his or her work at a
lower price to contractually retain rights in the work, but this does not
change under VARA. Many public entities are already demanding
waivers of VARA rights before allowing an artist to display his or her
work. 33 Although only time will tell, it is safe to assume that these
entities will either refuse to display the work, or offer the artist less
money, if the artist refuses to waive VARA rights.
A recent study of baby boomers by the National Endowment for the
Arts found that "many [baby boomers] simply [had] no interest in [the]
arts [and] others [had] a real hostility toward them."'134 The imes
suggested that part of the problem is that people are "suspicious of
anything that smacks of too much elitism."'135 VARA will reinforce this
image of elitism in the arts by taking decisions regarding art out of the

128. CARL KEYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 11-20 (1959), reprinted in
TRADE REGULATION 3 (Milton Handler et al. eds., 3d ed. 1993).
129. See id.
130. See id. at 3-5.
131. Carter v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 71 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1824
(1996).
132. Serra v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045, 1049 (2d Cir. 1988).
133. Thomas F. Berner, Bad Laws Make Hard Cases, N.Y. L. J., Mar. 29, 1995, at 2.
134. Rothstein, supra note 69, at 1.
135. Id. at 14.
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market and putting them into the hands of the federal court system. This
can only increase the hostility towards the arts.
13 6
V. ART SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE FREE MARKET

The federal government's attempt to insulate art from market forces
is hopelessly misguided. In Philip Howard's book, The Death of Common
Sense: How Law is Suffocating America, he suggests that "government
looks increasingly absurd because increasingly it tries to use detailed
laws as substitutes for reasonable judgments by individuals."' 37 VARA
is a perfect example. The very premise of VARA, that the American
people need the federal government to select what art the people of this
country will hold in high regard, proceeds on the assumption that the
American people have neither the intelligence nor the good sense to
decide for themselves. Such an assumption is not the basis for good law.
As Judge Learned Hand said, "the First Amendment ... presupposes that
right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this
is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."'3 8 Art
is simply safer in the hands139of a free market than it is in the hands of a
federal regulatory scheme.
It is hardly a radical idea to suggest that art be governed by the free
market. In a case where national security was an issue, Justice Holmes
concluded "that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas--that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market."' 40 In another case,
holding that states may not require the recital of the Pledge of Allegiance, the Supreme Court wrote, "we apply the limitations of the
Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually and spiritually
diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization.' 4 In
light of such truths, the fear that we risk imminent intellectual ruin by

136. Of course, I am not suggesting anything new here; art has always been governed by the
free market. However, in the days of federal funding for public broadcasting, the National
Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and VARA, the advantages
of the market no longer seem to be accepted as self evident.
137. George will, Too Many Laws Bring Disorder,NEWSDAY, Jan. 22, 1995, at A41.

138. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y, 1943).
139. See supra part IV.

140. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Abrams
involved a prosecution under the Espionage Act for the publication of disloyal and scurrilous materials. Id. at 617.
141. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943).
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subjecting art to market competition is unfounded.
This is not to suggest that government has no role in the arts-it has
a significant role in the arts through the legitimate exercise of the
copyright power." Also, the government has the power to preserve
genuine national treasures the old fashioned way-by purchasing them.
VARA, though, is akin to the federal government granting copyrights to
works that it likes and denying copyrights to works
it does not like--this
43
the government does not have the power to do.1
What seems to drive supporters of government intervention in art is
a lack of confidence in art itself.'" Art critics have long used abstract
principles to hide the mediocrity of much art. Twenty years ago, Tom
Wolfe, in The Painted Word, suggested that the concepts and theories
used in art criticism were being used to justify art that had little
merit. 45 As noted earlier, the New York Times has asserted that the
"dirty secret whispered by experts .. .[is] that much of the art that
critics write about is simply not very interesting.' ' 146 By taking art out
of the competitive marketplace, VARA appears to be the next step in a
process of obscuring the mediocrity of many works of art.
Of course, not all art lacks merit-clearly some art is extraordinary.
However, like literature, theater and all other creative undertakings, some
works are good, some are bad, and most, by definition, are average. The
only reliable way to tell the difference, and determine which are worth
preserving, is to let them compete unfettered by government regulation.
VI.

CONCLUSION

What may be most troubling about VARA is suggested in the title
itself: The Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990. The very notion that a
particular group of people has "rights" not shared by all is abhorrent to
our system of justice. Rights are a shield against the law, not a tool to
beat others into submission. 47 To the degree that artists have a special
right to have their reputation protected, they have that right at the
expense of everyone else's right to free speech. 148 Such a right is not
a "right" at all, but a privilege. The days of granting special privileges

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972); supra part III.B.3.
See supra part IV.
Schemo, supra note 113, at 16.
Id.
Will, supra note 137, at A41.
See supra part III.
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to classes of citizens, so they would not live under the same rules as
everyone else, are gone. The United States does not grant titles of
nobility.'49
Not that any of this would help artists anyway. Putting artists up on
such a pedestal only reinforces the suspicion that the arts are dominated
by elitists. 5 The New York Times, in reference to this suspicion, has
suggested that "the crisis in the arts [may be] democracy's revenge." 5'
VARA will certainly not help artists by putting them in further conflict
with democracy.
In a nation built on hard work and competition, by intelligent people
who value liberty above all else, legal recognition of moral rights is an
embarrassing step backwards. Regulation of moral rights by the federal
government clearly violates the Constitution as well as common sense.
Accordingly, VARA should be repealed.
Eric E. Bensen

149. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.8.
150. Rothstein, supra note 69, at 14.
151. Id.
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